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Barter Clubs and Exchanges: A New Source
of Inefficiency and Risk
By John O. Bornhofen
Over the past several years, a relatively new
development has occurred on the American
economic scene-the emergence of barter
clubs and exchanges. In both clubs and
exchanges, members swap goods and ser
vices and receive "points" (credits) in return.'
(Typically, each point is supposed to be worth
one dollar in value.)
The major reason for barter in modern-day
industrial America appears to be avoiding
taxes on income earned. Many barter parti
cipants apparently believe that since barter
transactions don't involve the exchange of
money for services rendered or goods sold
(traded), the (real) income obtained in the
transaction is not taxable. This notion is, of
course, incorrect. For instance, a gas station
owner who swaps gasoline or auto repairs
·th an electronics store owner for a new
. ,o cassette recorder is receiving income,
it is real or in kind rather than in cash. The
electronics store owner, likeWise, is receiving
income in real terms. The value of the trans
action is taxable to both.
The thrust of this article is not about taxes,
however. It is about barter as an economically
defective way to conduct trade. Although
barter clubs and exchanges reduce some of
the disadvantages of straight barter, they
create other problems, which I will discuss
later.
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Inefficiencies of Barter
In a straight barter transaction, goods and
services are traded for other goods and ser
vices. That's simple enough. But people with
goods and services to trade must find other
people with whom to trade. Thus, someone
who wishes to swap a stereo for a pair of skis
must find someone who has the right pair of
skis and wishes to trade them and wants a
stereo of a particular kind. Such a person
could be rare and hard to find.
This need to find someone who has what
we want and wants to trade for what we have
is known as the "double coincidence of
wants." The wants must coincide for a trade
to take place. Finding this person could be a
lengthy and costly process. Phone calls, ads,
and time spent in search all add up to high
transaction costs. 2 Even in the case of barter
clubs and exchanges, the inefficiency is easily
seen since they typically charge their members
a percentage (often 10 percent) of the value
of the transaction.
Thus, barter is generally a very costly way
to exchange goods and services. Using money
as a medium of exchange is far more efficient.
Since everyone accepts it, by definition the
double coincidence of wants doesn't exist and
the transaction costs are as low as possible.

The Function of a Club
The first function of a barter organization
is to act as a clearing house for information
about who has what to trade and (possibly)
what the trader wants in return. By going to
a central place with their wants, traders reduce
their search costs. The exchanges often
publish catalogues listing members and the
goods and services they supply. Thus, the
clubs reduce the costs of making barter trans
actions. So far, so good, but modern barter
organizations do more.
Typically, they set up a system of deferred
payments whereby a person can supply some
good or service to another when the other has
nothing Simultaneously to trade that the first
person wants. For instance, through the orga
nization, Mr. A, who has a bushel of potatoes
to trade and wants a bottle of tequila, can
supply the potatoes to someone who currently
has no tequila to trade, or for that matter, has
nothing whatsoever to trade (that interests A).
Instead of getting goods and services imme
diately, A gets "trade units" or "points" from
the barter organization for the value of the

potatoes. The units are then put into an
account for A and can be used immediately
to get goods and services from others, or they
can be used later. This arrangement reduces
the problem of the double coincidence of
wants.
However, there is the problem of deferred
payments-payments of goods and services
in the future. With any deferred payment,
there is a question of whether the payment
will actually be made. Will the persons mak
ing the promises to pay actually be willing and
able to carry them out when the time comes?
The possibility that they will not is called
"default risk."
With regular money, default risk is mini
mized through the high financial soundness,
integrity, and reputation of the money issuers
-typically the national government, the cen
tral banks, and!or the depositing financial
institutions, such as commercial banks. In the
case of banks, there is the additional reduc
tion in default risk through the use of deposit
insurance. Thus, the default risk on the assets
we use as money is as low as possible.
In the case of barter exchanges, the
exchange typically issues the trading units or
points. It owes them, and the default risk is
that it will not be willing or able to honor them.
If the club or exchange were to fold or the
operators leave town, members could be left
with worthless points and be lacking the goods
and services they supplied. Indeed, there
have been recent reports of people having
supplied major assets such as houses or land
in exchange for points and not being able to
use them. In less egregious Situations, peo
ple have eventually been able to sell the points
back to the exchange for money, but at big
discounts. In another case, a barter organiza
tion went bankrupt, and the operators
reputedly started a new one allOWing mem
bers in the bankrupt one to transfer units into
the new one but at sizeable discounts.
In addition, the possibility exists that the
operators of the barter organization can ob
tain goods and services for their own use and
issue trading units on the group's behalf to the
suppliers. The temptation must exist for
operators to do this on a large scale and then
abscond with the goods before the units can
be used. The possibility that this can happen
also means default risk to the holders of the
units.
continued on page 6

Distinguished Speakers at Seidtnall
Robert Lund, Senior Vice President of
Marketing at General Motors, spoke to
students, faculty, and staff Thursday,
November 15. His topic was "The Leadership
Role of the United States in Automotive
Marketing." He also met over lunch that day
with fifteen Seidman School Affiliates to
discuss domestic automotive production and
the Michigan economy.

Dr. Steven Skancke, former Staff Director
of the White House Conference on Produc
tivity and Deputy Counselor to the Secretary
of the Treasury, spoke to students, faculty,
and staff Wednesday, December 5. His topic
was "Profits and Productivity: Recipes for
Success." He met with Seidman faculty at a
luncheon to explore a number of productiv
ity issues. Dr. Skancke is Vice President of G.
Wilham Miller and Company.

Dr. James Buchanan, Director of the
Center for the Study of Public Choice at

George Mason University, was in Grand
Rapids and on campus on Thursday, April
18. He spoke to west Michigan area econo
mists at a breakfast meeting, to the Seidman
School Affiliates at lunch, and to the Grand
Valley students, faculty, and staff in the after
noon. His topic at the luncheon meeting was
"Federal Deficits and the Ethics of Default,"
and his speech on campus was entitled "Public
Choice Perspectives and the Ethics of De
fault." Dr. Buchanan's many publications
include The Economics of Politics, The
Calculus of Consent, and Fairness, Hope,
and Justice.

L. William Seidman, Dean of the School
of Business at Arizona State University, spoke
to students, faculty, and staff Thursday, April
25. His topic was "Productivity and Quality
in the United States." Mr. Seidman served as
Economic Policy Coordinator for President
Gerald R. Ford from 1973 to 1976 and as
Executive Vice President for Phelps Dodge
Corporation from 1976 to 1981.

L. William Seidman

Barter Clubs and Exchanges: A New Source
of Inefficiency and Risk
continued from page 1

These possibilities mean that additional
costs might have to be incurred to reduce de
fault risk. Potential members may have to in
vestigate the exchange and its operators and
their track records and credit standing. Thus,
as transactions costs are lowered by reducing
the double coincidence of wants, other costs
and risks are higher. But, whatever the mix
of costs incurred and risks taken, their total
is higher with barter than with the use of con
ventional money.
It should be noted that the units or points
produced by barter groups are an attempt to
create another kind of money-an inferior
one at that. The use of this "money" is limited
to the members of the barter group, of course.
It has no acceptability outside the group.
In effect, barter organizations are an in
between case, between straight barter, on the
one hand, and the use of money, on the
other. They issue a form of money but a
limited one.

Inefficiency in Supply
And Demand
Another source of inefficiency with barter
ing is that the prices at which trades take place
are not necessarily equal to the "equilibrium"
price. This occurs because of the limited
market for bartered goods and services,
whether that stems from the double coin

cidence of wants or the limited number of
trading partners in barter organizations.
At this point, you will realize that even
though goods and services may be bartered,
they are traded at "prices." The price of a
good or service in a trade is how much of
something else is given up for it. A price is
an "exchange ratio." For example, if three
chickens are traded for one pig, the exchange
ratio (the price) of pigs in terms of chickens
is three, and the price of chicken in terms of
pigs is one-third.
The equilibrium price (Pe ) at any particular
time is the price. that balances the supply of
the goods or services being traded with their
demand. Consider widgets as the good be
ing traded in a competitive market. Pe is the
equilibrium price of widgets. At Pe , the
number of Widgets demanders want is equal
to the amount of widgets offered for sale. At
Pe , there are no Widgets left over and there
are no unsatisfied demanders who are will
ing to pay Pe . Pe could be thought of as the
"true" price of widgets. The higher the pro
portion of transactions that take place at Pe,
the more perfect the market. However, the
more transactions that take place away from
Pe , the more imperfect the market.
In barter, the source of this market imper
fection and inefficiency is the fact that markets
for bartered goods are much smaller than
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those for the identical goods bought and sold
in regular markets with money Consider a
combined market for widgets in which most
are sold and a few are bartered. In a perfect
market with efficient prices, the price of
widgets throughout this combined market
should be the same for identical widgets,
regardless of whether the Widgets are traded
for money or for other goods and services.
However, because there are fewer trans
actions in the sub market for bartered Widgets
and fewer possible trading partners, the prices
of bartered Widgets can be very different from
those of widgets bought and sold for money.
A person offering Widgets in the barter sub·
market might get a lower exchange ratio
(lower price) than would be the case in the
monetary market. Similarly, someone
needing Widgets might pay a higher price than
in the regular market. In fact, it has been
reported that some business suppliers of
goods and services have vastly different prices
for their products, one price for the regular
market and another (much higher) for the
barter market.
There is no guarantee that the goods and
services that people want will be supplied
through the barter organization . Tremendous
imbalances can occur between supply and . 
mand within the barter submarket, and th
can allow transaction prices there to be co
siderably different from the true prices.
continued on page 7
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difference between transaction prices
and the true, or equilibrium, prices could also
distort resource allocation by giving off false
signals about the values of goods and services
traded. When scarce resources are misallo
cated, and some other goods and services are
forgone, there is waste. This waste is known
as "allocational inefficiency."

Avoiding Taxes
One reason buyers might submit to these
inferior prices is tax evasion. They might be
willing to pay the higher prices if the percent
age price differential is smaller than the tax
rate and if the trades can be concealed from
the tax man. Thus, people might be willing
to pay up to 50 percent more for goods or
services if their marginal tax rate is 50 percent.
Barter organizations do reduce the original
problems of double coincidence of wants and
high transactions costs but substitute in their
place default risk, an inferior type of money.
But the basic inefficiency associated with
barter still exists and causes a suboptimal
allocation of scarce resources in the overall
economy.
Why then do we waste resources this way?
To answer that. we must go back to tax eva
sion. People are attempting to escape high
rginal tax rates on income through the con
_
.nUality of barter transactions. Presumably,
e reduced tax load to an individual barterer
offsets the additional transactions costs, in
ferior prices, and/or default risk incurred.
Even though this makes sense on the micro
economic level. there is waste and inefficiency
on the macro, or social, level. Costs are higher
to conduct a given amount of production and
trade through barter or barter organizations
than with money. Resources used to carry out

barter and cope with increased default risk are
resources that don't produce other goods and
services. Thus, the economic well-being of
people is reduced.

Can Barter Be Eliminated?
What can be done to rectify this misal
location of scarce resources? There are several
possible approaches. First, marginal tax rates
could be reduced to make barter less appeal
ing. However, it is unlikely that rates can or
will be reduced enough to discourage this
practice. Second, enhanced knowledge of the
costs and risks of barter and barter clubs on
the part of potential barterers would reduce
some of the practice. If people have a general
idea of the search costs involved in overcom
ing the double coincidence of wants, the pos
sibility of inferior prices, and the risk of default
by other traders or barter clubs, the incidence
of barter should be reduced. Barter will not
be eliminated, however, as long as high
marginal income tax rates exist.
Third, having the authorities make sure
they tax barter transactions that produce in
come for the barterers would also reduce the
incidence of barter and its attendant waste.
In this regard, the IRS has recently required
that each barter exchange report the gross
transactions for each member on Form

1099's.
If barter clubs were required to record the
name of each person who makes a trade, the
type and amount of goods and services
traded, and the amount of credits awarded
in return, the value of the income-producing
transactions could be determined. 3 This
disclosure would be expected to raise the cost
of operating the clubs and to reduce their
attractiveness as tax-evasion devices.

In conclusion, resort to barter and barter
organizations amounts to high transactions
costs, inefficiency in the use of our scarce
resources and increased risk, throughout the
economic system. While barter organizations
convey benefits, they also involve costs and
risks that, at the macro level, outweigh the
benefits.
The root cause of all this appears to be high
marginal tax rates on income. But even if
trading through barter organizations is re
corded, taxed, and reduced, individuals can
still revert to straight barter, which is even
more inefficient.
I The difference between barter clubs and exchanges
appears to be that the former are made up of
individuals whereas business firms comprise the
latter. Barter exchanges are sometimes called trade
exchanges.
2 All costs represent what is given up to pursue one
alternative rather than others. Costs are usually
measured in money terms, but an out-of-pocket
payment in money is not necessary for a cost to
occur.
'Not all barter transactions are taxable income
producing transactions. Many are non-taxable
because they involve personal (as opposed to
capital) assets or personal expenditures.

Dr. John O. Bornhofen is Professor of
Economics and Finance and Chairman of the
Finance Department in the Seidman School
of Business.
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Economic Growth Resumes
continued from page 4
is currently running at about $220 billion per
year. The uncertainty is about when, which,
and how much. Clearly the deficit will not go
away-not with growth nor with any of the
deficit reduction schemes being discussed in
Washington.

Outlook

•

The outlook is for continual but erratic
economic growth in 1985. Real GNP is
expected to grow 3.5 to 4 percent. Unem
ployment could fall a bil more, but thaI will
happen much more gradually than in the past
0 years. We should go below 7 percent. In
ion may begin to creep up somewhat, but
I
should remain at 5 percent or under
throughout the first half of this year.

Although the near term looks rosy for the
national economy, the situation for Michigan
is more uncertain. While a buoyant economy
will support an even more buoyant automo
bile market, car production in Michigan will
be held down as the Japanese increase the
number of cars they sell in the U.S. market
following our lifting of the "voluntary" import
quotas on Japanese cars. While this will hurt
the domestic auto industry and Michigan
somewhat, it won't throw the state back into
recession. And the American consumer will
reap noticeable benefits.
Dr. John O. Bornhofen is a Professor of
Economics and Finance and Chairman of the
Finance Department in the Seidman School
of Business.
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standing of our economic system. facilitate
exchanges of ideas between students.
faculty, and bUSinessmen, and support
faculty research and professional develop
ment and, in general, enrich the business
and academic communities. Persons in
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Memo or the published articles should
contact Dr. Marvin G. DeVries. Dean. F. E.
Seidman School of Business. Lake Huron
Hall. Grand Valley State, Allendale. Mich
igan. 49401 Telephone 616-895-3271.

